Somebody Else\u27s Problem: How the United States and Canada Violate International Law and Fail to Ensure the Prosecution of War Criminals by Weiss, Nicholas P.
Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 45 | Issue 1
2012
Somebody Else's Problem: How the United States
and Canada Violate International Law and Fail to
Ensure the Prosecution of War Criminals
Nicholas P. Weiss
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Nicholas P. Weiss, Somebody Else's Problem: How the United States and Canada Violate International Law and Fail to Ensure the
Prosecution of War Criminals, 45 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 579 (2012)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol45/iss1/16
 Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law 
Volume 45 Fall 2012 Issues 1 & 2 
 
 
Somebody Else’s Problem:  
How the United States and Canada 
Violate International Law and Fail to 
Ensure the Prosecution of  
War Criminals    
Nicholas P. Weiss  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW·VOL. 45·2012 
Somebody Else’s Problem: How 
the United States and Canada 
Violate International Law and 
Fail to Ensure the Prosecution 
of War Criminals 
Nicholas P. Weiss* 
The United States and Canada have created programs to 
ensure that they will not be havens for war criminals and human 
rights violators. This, however, fails to meet their international 
legal obligation to ensure that suspected war criminals and 
human rights violators will be prosecuted for their crimes. This 
Note analyzes and compares the war crimes prosecution policies 
of Canada and the United States. It concludes that both 
countries take inadequate measures to ensure war criminals are 
prosecuted for their crimes, and thus, these countries are failing 
to meet their international obligations. This Note recommends 
both countries implement statutes to ensure suspected war 
criminals are prosecuted, forcing Canada and the United States 
to conform to their international obligations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In June 2011, the Canadian government asked its citizens to help 
it in the hunt for thirty suspected war criminals living in Canada.1 
However, instead of bringing the war criminals to justice, Canada 
began to remove them from the country without any guarantee  the 
suspects would be prosecuted.2 Addressing criticism for failing to 
ensure prosecution, Canada’s Safety Minister, Vic Toews, declared 
“Canada is not the UN. It’s not our responsibility to make sure each 
one of these [suspected criminals] faces justice in their own 
countries[.]”3 Thirty people suspected of war crimes may never be 
prosecuted. Instead, they will simply go back to their lives. When 
faced with the responsibility of ensuring that war criminals are 
prosecuted, Canada chose practical expediency over justice.  
This Note argues that both the United States and Canada have 
abrogated their legal obligations by failing to ensure that war 
criminals and perpetrators of crimes against humanity are brought to 
justice.4 These countries must either prosecute for substantive 
offenses, or ensure that other states prosecute for the substantive 
offenses if they are to prevent those who have committed atrocities 
1. See Ottawa Seeks ‘War Criminals’ Hiding in Canada, BBC, July 21, 
2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-14243919.  
2. See War Crimes Suspects’ Prosecution Uncertain, CBC NEWS, July 27, 
2011, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2011/07/27/pol-war-cr 
 imes-prosecution.html. 
3. Laura Payton, War Crimes Prosecution Not Up to Canada, Toews 
Says, CBC NEWS, Aug. 3, 2011, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story 
/2011/08/03/war-crimes-suspect-toronto-arrest.html. 
4. This Note in no way intends to denigrate the incredible work done by 
both the United States and Canada in ensuring that war criminals and 
those who commit crimes against humanity do not find safe harbor 
within their borders. However, both countries still have not met the 
obligations that have been established through international agreement. 
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from going free.5 Both the United States and Canada have overcome 
their decades-long problems of insufficient temporal and geographic 
jurisdictions to prosecute for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.6 However, simply possessing jurisdiction to prosecute is not 
sufficient to achieve the obligations set by treaty and custom. To 
fulfill their international obligations, Canada and the United States 
must ensure the war criminals and human rights violators within their 
borders are prosecuted. 
This Note is divided in five parts. Part II outlines the jurisdiction 
and history of Canada’s successes and failures in ensuring the 
prosecution of war criminals. Part III does the same for the United 
States. Part IV analyzes the international obligations the United 
States and Canada, failing to ensure prosecution of war criminals, 
have violated. Part V advocates some statutory remedies both 
Canada and the United States should enact to meet their legal 
obligations. 
Canada and the United States have made it a priority to identify 
and apprehend individuals found in their borders who have committed 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.7 Within the past twenty 
years, the different strategies employed by each country to apprehend 
and bring to justice such individuals have begun to converge.8 
Starting in 1979, the United States began a serious effort to locate, 
5. Thanks to Professor David Crane, former Chief Prosecutor of the 
Special Court of Sierra Leone, for introducing me to the concept of the 
beast of impunity and the absolute necessity of ensuring that those who 
committed the worst atrocities cannot escape justice. Thanks to Eli 
Rosenbaum, Director of Strategy and Policy of the Human Rights and 
Special Prosecutions Section of the US Department of Justice; Robert 
Petit, Counsel for the War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity 
Section of the Canada Department of Justice; and Matt Eisenbrandt, 
Legal Counsel for the Canadian Center for International Justice for 
agreeing to be interviewed for this Note. 
6. The United States has jurisdiction to prosecute for grave breaches of 
international law, crimes against humanity, and war crimes through 
several statutes. See Torture, 18 U.S.C. § 2340(A) (2001); War Crimes, 
18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006); Recruitment or Use of Child Soldiers, 18 
U.S.C. § 2442 (2008); Genocide, 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2009); Section to 
Enforce Human Rights Laws, 28 U.S.C. § 509B (2010). Canada now has 
jurisdiction through the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes 
Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24 (Can.). 
7. Canada instituted a statute in 1987 granting jurisdiction to prosecute 
for war crimes and crimes against humanity for any person in Canada as 
if they had committed the crime in Canada. Act to Amend the Criminal 
Code, S.C. 1987, c. 37 (Can.). Canada replaced the 1987 legislation in 
2000 with the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act. See 
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24 (Can.). 
8. For the purposes of this Note, I will not address civil damages, only 
criminal punishment. 
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apprehend, and deport war crimes suspects, particularly those 
associated with the Nazi genocide.9 Canada, on the other hand, held 
the unfortunate stigma of being a haven for Nazi war criminals and 
did not truly begin apprehending suspected war criminals until 1995.10 
The United States has largely either removed suspected war 
criminals from the country or prosecuted these individuals for 
naturalization or immigration fraud.11 This is partly because the 
United States only recently passed legislation granting universal 
jurisdiction for war crimes and crimes against humanity.12 Canada, on 
the other hand, tends to remove suspects from Canada rather than 
seek any kind of criminal prosecution.13 Both are responding to the 
9. The Simon Wiesenthal Center, an NGO that monitors and ranks 
countries’ effectiveness at investigating and prosecuting Nazi war 
criminals, has given the United States the highest ranking of any 
country every year since the center’s inception in 2002. EFRAIM ZUROFF, 
WORLDWIDE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF NAZI WAR CRIMINALS 
27 (2010). The Wiesenthal Center notes: 
Since its establishment in 1979, the [Office of Special 
Investigations], recently renamed the Human Rights and Special 
Prosecution Section, (HRSPS) [sic] currently headed by Eli M. 
Rosenbaum, Esq., has conducted the most successful program of 
its kind in the world, and has been a model of proactive 
investigation and prosecution of Holocaust perpetrators for the 
past three decades. Its outstanding performance has earned it 
unique status, as the only agency to have received the highest 
possible grade every single year since this report was launched in 
2002.  
 Id.  
10. Until 1982, no action, not even a deportation, was enacted against the 
estimated 3,000 Nazi war criminals living in Canada following World 
War II. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, Canada Says It Will Punish War 
Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995 
/04/09/world/canada-says-it-will-punish-war-criminals.html. In the mid-
1990s, Canada created an organization to coordinate the search for war 
criminals. CANADA BORDER SERVICES AGENCY ET AL., ELEVENTH ANNUAL 
REPORT: CANADA’S PROGRAM ON CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR 
CRIMES 2007–2008, at 2 (2008), available at http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca 
/pubs/ wc-cg-eng.pdf [hereinafter CBSA REPORT 2008]. 
11. Though the United States often will deport those who have lied on 
naturalization forms, lying about especially heinous crimes can result in 
severe punishment. In one instance, a former Guatemalan death squad 
member was sentenced to ten years for lying about his involvement in a 
massacre. See U.S. Jails Guatemalan Ex-Soldier for Hiding Massacre 
Role, BBC, Sept. 16, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-
america-11338246; Telephone Interview with Eli Rosenbaum, Dir. of 
Hum. Rts. Enforcement Strategy and Pol’y, Hum. Rts. and Special 
Prosecution Sec., U.S. Dep’t of Just. (Dec. 9, 2011) [hereinafter 
Rosenbaum Interview]. 
12. Section to Enforce Human Rights Laws, 28 U.S.C. § 509B (2010). 
13. See War Crimes Suspects’ Prosecution Uncertain, supra note 2.  
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difficulties inherent in prosecuting war crimes that occurred far 
outside their borders but are doing so in a way that violates 
international legal obligations. The United States and Canada have 
declined to prosecute suspected war criminals and opted instead to 
either prosecute for immigration-related violations or deport without 
assurances that those suspected of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity will be prosecuted. Both states are bound by international 
agreements to ensure prosecution, yet both have failed to meet their 
international obligations.14 
II. CANADA DOES NOT ENSURE THE PROSECUTION OF WAR 
CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
While Canada has enacted legislation to prosecute war criminals 
and human rights violators, the actual effect in prosecuting war 
criminals has been fairly impotent. A combination of little political 
will and restrictive Supreme Court rulings15 has stymied domestic 
prosecution of war criminals. To date, Canada has prosecuted, 
convicted, and sentenced only a single war criminal.16 Canada’s record 
in ensuring that war criminals are prosecuted abroad once they have 
14. These agreements are spelled out in Section III, but include the Geneva 
Conventions and the Torture Convention. See Geneva Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6, U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention]. Article 49 reads: 
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to 
search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered 
to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such 
persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It 
may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of 
its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another 
High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High 
Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case. 
 
 Id. art. 49. See generally Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, June 26, 1987, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention]. 
15. See Irwin Cotler, International Decision, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 460, 461 
(1996). The Canadian Department of Justice justified their change in 
strategy in prosecuting suspected war criminals by saying of 
the Finta case that “the Court established a higher standard of proof for 
the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity than is 
recognized at international law. For the World War II cases, this 
decision has made prosecution of these crimes much more difficult and 
less likely.” Id.  
16. See CBSA REPORT 2008, supra note 10, at 9–10 (reporting on the fate 
of Desiré Munyaneza, a Rwandan citizen convicted in Canada for war 
crimes committed in Rwanda). 
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been removed from Canada is equally dismal. Canada has become 
very effective at removing suspected war criminals, but not nearly as 
effective in ensuring they face justice. 
A. Canada’s Jurisdiction 
Canada has statutory jurisdiction to prosecute suspected war 
criminals under the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act 
(“Canada War Crimes Act” or “the Act”).17 The Canada War Crimes 
Act was enacted on June 29, 2000 to domesticate the Rome Treaty.18 
It grants Canada the statutory jurisdiction to prosecute genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes, regardless of where or 
against whom the crimes took place, and specifically permits 
Canadian courts to prosecute crimes committed before the Act was 
enacted.19 With its retroactive provision, the Act grants Canada 
greater jurisdiction to prosecute war criminals than even the Rome 
Statute permits the International Criminal Court (ICC).20 The 
Canada War Crimes Act states that if an intentional killing forms the 
basis of the offense, the perpetrator shall be imprisoned for life.21 This 
17. See Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24 
(Can.). 
18. See id. pmbl. (“An Act respecting genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes and to implement the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, and to make consequential amendments to other 
Acts.”). 
19. Id. § 6(1)–(1.1). The statue reads: 
(1) Every person who, either before or after the coming into 
force of this section, commits outside Canada  
     (a) genocide,  
     (b) a crime against humanity, or  
     (c) a war crime,  
is guilty of an indictable offence and may be prosecuted for that 
offence in accordance with section 8.  
 
(1.1)Every person who conspires or attempts to commit, is an 
accessory after the fact in relation to, or counsels in relation to, 
an offence referred to in subsection (1) is guilty of an indictable 
offence. 
 Id.  
20. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 11, July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Article 11 of the 
Rome Statute limits temporal jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) to the date of its founding. Id. Article 25 denies 
jurisdiction over persons under 18 at the times of their alleged offense. 
Id. art. 25. The Canada War Crimes Act has no imposed age limitations 
for prosecution. See Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 
S.C. 2000, c. 24 (Can.). 
21. Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, art. 4(2), S.C. 2000, c. 
24 (Can.).  
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is a substantially more stringent standard than the Rome Statute, 
which merely permits the ICC to imprison a suspect for a term of 
years up to life.22 
B. Canada’s History of Investigation and Prosecution of War Crimes 
and Crimes Against Humanity 
Canada’s expansion of jurisdiction was driven in large part by 
Canada’s unfortunate legacy of permissiveness towards war 
criminals.23 Some organizations estimate that as many as 3,000 Nazi 
war criminals fled to Canada after World War II.24 Following 
condemnation by international organizations, Canada adjusted its 
criminal code in 1987 to enable the prosecution of Nazi war criminals 
living in Canada.25 Yet, the 1987 legislation is largely considered a 
failure.26 Only four prosecutions were ever attempted.27 Three of the 
accused had their charges dropped outright, and the fourth ended in 
acquittal.28  
The last attempt to prosecute Nazi war criminals in Canada 
resulted in the acquittal of Imre Finta.29 Canada charged Finta with 
manslaughter, kidnapping, unlawful confinement, and robbery in 
relation to his alleged activities as a police officer assisting the Nazis 
in the forced deportation of 8,617 Jews from Szeged during the 
Holocaust.30 The Canadian Supreme Court made a bewildering ruling 
in which it established a broad defense of superior orders that 
22. See Rome Statute, supra note 20, § 77 (limiting punishment to a 
maximum of thirty years except in cases of extreme gravity, which allow 
a sentence of life imprisonment).  
23. See About Us, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES PROG., 
DEP’T OF JUST. CANADA, http://www.justice.gc.ca/warcrimes-crimesdeg 
uerre/crime-crime-eng.asp (last updated May 19, 2010). 
24. See Anthony DePalma, Canada Called Haven for Nazi Criminals, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 3, 1997, at A6. 
25. See About Us, supra note 23. This followed a 1986 report by the 
Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals which found that reports of 
widespread Nazi war criminals living in Canada were true. Id. 
26. See DePalma, supra note 24. Until the legislation was updated in 2000, 
Canada had prosecuted only four Nazi war criminals out of the 
estimated thousands living in Canada with no convictions. Id. 
27. See id. 
28. See id.; Public Report, Canada’s War Crimes Program, CITIZENSHIP AND 
IMMIG. CANADA (July 21, 1998) [hereinafter Public Report 1998], 
http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/202/301/can_war_crimes_public_ 
report/1998/english/pub/war1998.html. 
29. See R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 705 (Can.) (dismissing the appeal 
of acquittal at the trial level). 
30. See id. at 702. 
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departed from international practice.31 The court also applied a 
heightened actus reus requirement found nowhere in either 
international or Canadian law.32 
This ruling handicapped Canadian prosecution of war crimes and 
reinforced the perception that Canada was not serious about 
addressing the issue of suspected war criminals living in Canada.33 
While Canada could have reacted to this setback by increasing the 
total deportation of war criminals, Canada successfully extradited or 
deported only two suspected war criminals between 1980 and 1997.34 
Since the implementation of the War Crimes Prosecution Act, 
only one person has been successfully prosecuted to conviction.35 In 
1997, Désiré Munyaneza emigrated from Rwanda to Canada.36 In 
2000, the same year as the passage of the Canada War Crimes Act, 
the Immigration and Refuge Board rejected his application for refugee 
status, finding reason to believe that Munyaneza had participated in 
the 1994 Rwandan genocide.37 Munyaneza was finally charged in 
31. See id. at 707. The court stated:  
The defence of obedience to superior orders and the peace officer 
defence are available to members of the military or police forces 
in prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
Those defences are subject to the manifest illegality test: the 
defences are not available where the orders in question were 
manifestly unlawful. Even where the orders were manifestly 
unlawful, the defence of obedience to superior orders and the 
peace officer defence will be available in those circumstances 
where the accused had no moral choice as to whether to follow 
the orders. There can be no moral choice where there was such 
an air of compulsion and threat to the accused that he or she 
had no alternative but to obey the orders. 
 Id.  
32. See generally Irwin Cotler, War Crimes Law and the Finta Case, 6 SUP. 
CT. L. REV. 577 (1995) (critiquing the court’s legal evaluation in Finta); 
see also Cotler, supra note 15, at 467 (arguing the court 
mischaracterized the elements of the actus reus).  
33. See Irwin Cotler, Bringing Nazi War Criminals in Canada to Justice: A 
Case Study, 91 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 262, 268 (1997) (asserting that 
the ruling in Finta demonstrates “inadequate appreciation” for either 
international law or the international aspects of national law and creates 
“disturbing precedents and principles for war crimes generally”) 
[hereinafter Cotler, A Case Study].  
34. See DePalma, supra note 24. 
35. Nazi War Criminals in Canada, CBC, May. 12, 2011, http:// 
www.cbc.ca/news/business/story/2011/05/12/f-nazi-war-criminals-
canada.html.  
36. See Desire Munyaneza, TRIAL, http://www.trial-ch.org/en/ressources/ 
trial-watch/trial-watch/profils/profile/423/action/show/controller/ 
Profile.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2012).   
37. See id. 
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2005, after Rwandan-Canadians recognized him living in their 
community.38 
Munyaneza was charged and convicted of seven counts of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes for acts of murder, 
sexual violence, and pillage committed in Rwanda in 1994.39 He was 
sentenced by the Quebec Superior Court on October 29, 2009.40 The 
court gave Munyaneza life without the possibility of parole for 
twenty-five years.41 
The second and only other person to be indicted under the 
Canada War Crimes Act is Jacques Mungwarere, also a Rwandan.42 
He was arrested on November 6, 2009, several weeks after 
Munyaneza’s sentencing.43 Mungwarere was ultimately charged with 
one count of genocide and one count of crimes against humanity.44 
The trial began on April 30, 2012.45 
C. Canada’s Preference for Removal of War Crimes Suspects 
The Munyaneza and Mungwarere cases could have signaled an 
end to the impunity granted to suspected war criminals in Canada. 
Unfortunately, Canada has adopted a policy of deportation of 
suspected war criminals, rather than seeking criminal prosecution.46 
Canada currently prosecutes suspected war criminals through the 
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Program (War Crimes 
Program) in Canada’s Department of Justice.47 Since 1998, the War 
Crimes Program has been the coordinating force between the 
Department of Justice, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Citizen 
and Immigration in Canada, and the Canada Border Service Agency 
(CBSA) in the search for and disposition of suspected war criminals.48 
38. Nazi War Criminals in Canada, supra note 35.  
39. R. v. Munyaneza, 2009 Q.C.C.S. 2201, § 3.4 ¶ 129 (Can.)  
40. Id. § 9.  
41. Nazi War Criminals in Canada, supra note 35. 
42. Successes, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES PROGRAM, 
DEP’T OF JUST. CANADA, http://www.justice.gc.ca/warcrimes-crimesdeg 
uerre/successes-realisations-eng.asp (last updated Apr. 20, 2010). 
43. See id. 
44. CCIH’s Public Cases and Interventions, Jacques Mungwarere, CAN. 
CTR. INT’L JUST., http://www.ccij.ca/programs/cases/index.php?DOC_ 
INST=19.  
45. Id. 
46. See Payton, supra note 3 (presenting Canada’s Public Safety Minister 
Vic Toews’s argument that it is the responsibility of other countries, not 
Canada, to prosecute war criminals). 
47. See About Us, supra note 23.  
48. Id. 
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This combination of authorities focuses on denying entry and 
removing war crimes suspects from Canada.49 
The goal of the War Crimes Program is to ensure that Canada is 
not a safe haven for war criminals.50 Rather than prosecute war 
criminals, the preferred method of justice has been the prevention of 
the immigration of war criminals and the deportation of war crimes 
suspects.51 Although the current administrators of the War Crimes 
Program tout their model as an example to the world,52 Canada faces 
significant criticism that its War Crimes Program does not go far 
enough in ensuring that war criminals face justice.53  
In 1995, partially in response to the failed prosecution efforts, the 
Canadian government switched its focus from prosecutions to 
revocations of citizenship and deportations of suspected war 
criminals.54 These efforts were assisted in 2001 when Canada granted 
itself power to deport suspected war criminals through the 
49. See id. The stated operational objectives are: 
To prevent the admission to Canada of people involved in war 
crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide; [t]o detect, at the 
earliest possible opportunity, alleged perpetrators of war crimes, 
crimes against humanity or genocide who are in Canada, and 
take steps to prevent them from obtaining status or citizenship; 
[t]o revoke the status or citizenship of individuals involved or 
complicit in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide 
who are in Canada, and remove them from Canada; and [t]o 
examine all claims that there are suspected perpetrators of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity living in Canada and, where 
appropriate, investigate and prosecute these individuals. 
 Id.  
50. Id.  
51. CANADA BORDER SERVICES AGENCY ET AL., TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT: 
CANADA’S PROGRAM ON CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES 
2008–2011, at 3 (2011), available at http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/security-
securite/wc-cg/bsf5039-eng.pdf [hereinafter CBSA REPORT 2011].  
52. See Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Program, DEPT. OF 
JUST. CANADA, http://www.justice.gc.ca/warcrimes-crimesdeguerre/ 
crime-crime-eng.asp (last updated May 19, 2010) (stating that Canada’s 
War Crimes Program is internationally recognized as being a highly 
effective inter-departmental initiative). 
53. See Fannie Lafontaine, Canada’s Crimes Against Humanity and War 
Crimes Act on Trial: An Analysis of the Munyaneza Case, 8 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 269, 287 (2010) (criticizing, among other things, Canada’s 
overreliance on administrative remedies instead of criminal prosecution 
when dealing with war criminals); Cotler, A Case Study, supra note 33, 
at 262–63 (arguing Canada has failed to enforce international criminal 
law). 
54. See Public Report 1998, supra note 28.  
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Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.55 Between 1997 and 2008, 
Canada removed 466 people under the Act for suspicion of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.56 
Canada’s politicians have found it far easier to simply deport 
suspected war criminals rather than extradite or prosecute them.57 
Many Canadian policymakers support the deportation option, and 
many have commented that Canada has no intention, and should 
have no intention, of using the power of the Canada War Crimes Act 
to prosecute foreigners.58 Other Canadian officials see this as the 
natural right of Canada to protect its own borders.59  
Canada’s policymakers also seem to be responding, in part, to 
public opinion on suspected war criminals generally. In a public 
opinion poll, CBC News found that a majority of Canadians polled 
favored deportation without condition of prosecution for suspected 
war criminals living in Canada.60 In response to this public sentiment, 
55. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Can.). 
Section 35 states:  
(1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on 
grounds of violating human or international rights for  
     (a) committing an act outside Canada that constitutes an      
      offence referred to in sections 4 to 7 of the Crimes Against  
     Humanity and War Crimes Act;  
     (b) being a prescribed senior official in the service of a   
      government that, in the opinion of the Minister, engages or  
      has engaged in terrorism, systematic or gross human rights  
      violations, or genocide, a war crime or a crime against  
      humanity within the meaning of subsections 6(3) to (5) of  
      the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act . . . .  
 Id. § 35. 
56. CBSA REPORT 2008, supra note 10, at 14. The Immigration Act itself 
was amended in several times. Its current status is a result of 2002 
legislation, renaming it the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Can.).  
57. See CBSA REPORT 2008, supra note 10, at 1 (“The primary goal of the 
War Crimes Program is to deny safe haven in Canada to war criminals . 
. . .”).  
58. See Payton, supra note 3 (noting Canada’s Public Safety Minister Vic 
Toews’s preference for other countries to conduct prosecutions) 
59. Telephone Interview with Robert Petit, Counsel, Crimes Against 
Humanity and War Crimes Sect., Canada Dep’t of Just., (Feb. 29, 2012) 
[hereinafter Petit Interview]. When asked what factors were taken into 
consideration in choosing to deport those being sought by the 
government, Mr. Petit responded “there is really only one [factor], if the 
individual has no right to be in Canada.” Id. 
60. See How Should Canada Handle Alleged War Criminals?, CBC NEWS, 
July 29, 2011, http://www.cbc.ca/news/yourcommunity/2011/07/ how-
should-canada-handle-alleged-war-criminals.html (revealing a non-
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Canada’s politicians have attempted to frame the decision to expel 
war criminals rather than prosecute as a response to public opinion.61 
Recently, Canada has become more public and aggressive in 
identifying and removing suspected war criminals. In July of 2011, the 
CBSA sought the public’s assistance in apprehending and deporting 
thirty suspected war criminals living in Canada.62 As of this writing, 
five war criminals have been apprehended by the CBSA and three 
have been removed as a result of the program.63 Canada has no 
statutory obligation to verify that any person removed for suspicion of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity will be prosecuted once they 
are removed.64  
III. The United States Does Not Ensure the 
Prosecution of War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity 
The United States has an excellent record of locating suspected 
war criminals, especially former Nazis.65 However, once it has located 
them, the United States has largely chosen either to try them for 
immigration or naturalization fraud, or remove the suspects from the 
United States without adequate assurance that they will be 
prosecuted. This violates the United States’ legal obligation to ensure 
the prosecution of suspected war criminals. 
A. United States’ Jurisdiction 
The United States has statutory jurisdiction to prosecute war 
criminals for war crimes,66 genocide,67 torture,68 or use of child 
scientific survey of reader responses showing support for deportation 
without due process). 
61. See Payton, supra note 3 (noting Towes’s preference for removal was a 
matter of safety for the Canadian public and public interest). 
62. Id.  
63. Fifth Suspected War Criminal in Custody, PUB. SAFETY CANADA (July 
28, 2011), http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/media/nr/2011/nr20110728-
eng.aspx?rss=false; Third Individual on CBSA ‘Wanted’ List Removed 
from Canada, CANADA BORDER SERV. AGENCY (Aug. 11, 2011), 
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/media/release-communique/2011/2011-08-
11-eng.html. 
64. See Payton, supra note 3.  
65. See ZUROFF, supra note 9, at 5 (awarding the highest grade to the 
United States for successful war crime prosecutions). 
66. War Crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a)–(b) (2006). 
67. Genocide, 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e) (2009). 
68. Torture, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(b) (2001). 
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soldiers.69 These acts have limited temporal jurisdiction.70 They do 
not permit prosecution for any crime committed prior to their 
enactment, and, in the case of war crimes and the 1988 genocide 
statute (pre-revision), do not apply to non-United States citizens 
unless the crimes were committed against U.S. citizens.71  
The limits of jurisdiction have resulted in creative prosecution. 
For many years, criminal proceedings against suspected war criminals 
for substantive crimes were not possible in the United States due to 
lack of statutory jurisdiction.72 If the United States wanted to initiate 
any criminal proceeding, prosecutors were forced to prove immigration 
fraud or naturalization fraud.73 Even this proved difficult, as the 
statutes of limitations on naturalization fraud and visa fraud were ten 
years and five years respectively.74 
B. The United States’ History of Investigation and Prosecution of War 
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity 
Until 1979, prosecution and deportation of suspected Nazi war 
criminals living in the United States were conducted through the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service.75 This arrangement was an 
enormous failure. From the end of World War II to 1979 only two 
Nazi persecutors were removed from the United States.76 Some 
evidence indicates that the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
69. Recruitment or Use of Child Soldiers, 18 U.S.C. § 2442(c) (2008). 
70. The United States Constitution prohibits the prosecution of crimes that 
were not illegal at the time they were committed through the ex post 
facto clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; but see Eric S. Kobrick, The 
Ex Post Facto Prohibition and the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction 
Over International Crimes, 87 COL. L. REV. 1515, 1528 (1987) (arguing 
that crimes of universal jurisdiction may be prosecuted without violating 
the ex post facto clause).  
71. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(b). 
72. See Eli M. Rosenbaum, An Introduction to the Work of the Office of 
Special Investigations, USA BULLETIN, Jan. 2006, at 1 (noting the 
constitutional limitations on criminal proceedings, which have forced the 
Department of Justice to turn to deportation and removal actions); but 
see Michael P. Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based Jurisdiction to 
Nationals of Non-State Parties, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 363, 366 (2001) 
(arguing, in part, that certain crimes, including torture, genocide, and 
other crimes against humanity are subject to universal jurisdiction even 
without direct statutory approval.) 
73. Rosenbaum Interview, supra note 11.  
74. Id.  
75. Rosenbaum, supra note 72, at 2. 
76. See id. 
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actually intentionally assisted many Nazis in their attempts to enter 
the country.77 
To rectify the situation, in 1979 the United States created the 
Office of Special Investigations (OSI) to investigate and prosecute 
suspected Nazi war criminals living in the United States.78 The 
program was enormously successful in seeking out former Nazis. By 
2008, the OSI had launched—and won—proceedings against 107 
people linked to Nazi-era war crimes.79  
The United States gradually began shifting their focus from Nazi 
war criminals to a more general search for modern war criminals and 
human rights abusers. This shift was motivated, in part, by a series of 
reports in the early 1990s, which concluded that the United States 
was being used as a safe haven for human rights violators, especially 
torturers.80 In 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence and Terrorism 
Prevention Act, giving OSI the added responsibility of bringing civil 
and criminal denaturalization cases against modern day war criminals 
and human rights abusers.81 In 2009, OSI was merged into the Human 
Rights and Special Prosecution Section within the Department of 
Justice.82 
Other organizations cooperate with the Human Rights and Special 
Prosecution Section. The Human Rights Violators and War Crimes 
Unit of Immigration and Customs Enforcement is tasked with 
preventing foreign war crimes suspects, persecutors, and human rights 
abusers from entering the United States.83 It also identifies, 
prosecutes, and removes suspected war criminals and human rights 
abusers from the United States.84 
The US record on successful prosecution and conviction for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity is less impressive than that of 
Canada. In 2008, Charles “Chuckie” Taylor, son of Charles Taylor, 
77. See Eric Lichtblau, Nazis Were Given ‘Safe Haven’ in U.S., Report 
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2010, at A1. 
78. Rosenbaum, supra 72, at 2. 
79. See Rosenbaum Interview, supra note 11. 
80. See William J. Aceves, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A SAFE HAVEN FOR 
TORTURERS 22–24 (2002) (noting the United States has failed to 
prosecute a single individual for torture since criminalizing acts of 
torture committed outside the United States in 1994). 
81. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 50 U.S.C. § 
5505(b)(1) (2004).  
82. See Human Rights Enforcement Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2009). 
83. See Overview, The Human Rights Violators and War Crimes Unit, US 
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/human-rights-
violators/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2012) [hereinafter War Crimes Unit 
Overview]. 
84. Id.  
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former president of Liberia and convicted war criminal, received a 97-
year sentence under the 1994 Torture Statute.85 He was the first, and 
so far only, person to be prosecuted under the Torture Statute. 86 
Aside from Taylor, the United States has not completed any kind of 
domestic criminal prosecution for war crimes or crimes against 
humanity. 
C. The United States’ Preference for Using Immigration Law Against 
War Crimes Suspects 
The United States’ general policy towards those suspected of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity has been to deny them a safe 
haven.87 If a suspected war criminal enters the United States, the 
United States has several options to deal with the suspect. It may 
criminally prosecute for the underlying offense,88 criminally prosecute 
for naturalization or immigration fraud,89 extradite the suspect to 
another country,90 or deport the suspect.91 
Like Canada, the United States’ most common solution for 
suspected war criminals and human rights violators is removal from 
the country. The removal process does not require any guarantee that 
the recipient country prosecute. Since 2004, the Human Rights 
Violators and War Crimes Unit, the unit responsible for apprehending 
and removing suspects of war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
85. See United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 793 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(affirming the trial court’s 97-year sentence). 
86. See Q & A: Charles ‘Chuckie’ Taylor, Jr.’s Trial in the United States 
for Torture Committed in Liberia, HUMAN RTS. WATCH (Sept. 23, 
2008), http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/09/23/q-charles-chuckie-taylor-
jr-s-trial-united-states-torture-committed-liberia (noting Taylor was the 
first ever prosecuted under the Torture Statute).  
87. See War Crimes Unit Overview, supra note 83 (describing the “No Safe 
Haven Initiative”).  
88. See supra Part III(A) (outlining the United States’ jurisdiction over war 
crimes). 
89. See Naturalization, Citizenship or Alien Registry, 18 U.S.C. § 1015(f) 
(2000); Fraud and Misuse of Visas, Permits and Other Documents, 18 
U.S.C. § 1546(a)–(c) (2002). For suspected war criminals, this duty falls 
on the Human Rights and Special Prosecution Section of the 
Department of Justice. See Our Mission, The Human Rights and Special 
Prosecution Section, DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/ 
criminal/hrsp/. 
90. See Fugitives from State, Territory, or Possession into Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction of United States, 18 USC § 3183 (2002). 
91. See War Crimes Unit Overview, supra note 83 (describing the unit’s 
authority to deport suspected war criminals and human rights 
violators).  
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has removed over 540 suspected human rights violators.92 While this 
mass deportation of suspected war criminals is consistent with the 
goal of denying war criminals a safe haven, it does nothing to ensure 
that human rights abusers are actually brought to justice.  
This does not mean that the United States will always choose to 
deport rather than extradite or prosecute. “We do have a strong 
national interest in seeing that our immigration and citizenship laws 
are not violated,” said Eli Rosenbaum, Director of Human Rights 
Enforcement Strategy and Policy of the Human Rights and Special 
Prosecution Section of the US Department of Justice.93 “[I]f we have a 
provable case of visa or naturalization fraud, we generally are 
interested in prosecuting those cases,” he explained.94 Generally, the 
legal and economic value of deportation wins out, as “[f]rom the 
standpoint of the American taxpayer, it is very cost effective.”95 
Ensuring that war criminals stand trial for their substantive 
crimes is often incredibly difficult. According to Rosenbaum 
“extradition is a much faster process than denaturalization and 
deportation. Alas, there were very few requests for extradition. There 
were many attempts made by the Justice Department to persuade 
other countries . . . to request extradition, but they very rarely did.”96 
The United States’ policy in choosing whether to prosecute or 
deport is determined case-by-case.97 The United States generally 
prefers human rights violators be tried in their home countries.98 In 
Rosenbaum’s view, “we generally favor extradition both because the 
evidence tends to exist in the country in which the crimes took place . 
. . [and it] permits the community whose laws were violated to see 
justice being done.”99 
If the United States chooses not to remove a war crimes suspect, 
it will frequently use domestic immigration law to prosecute suspected 
war criminals, but not for the actual war crime or crime against 
humanity.100 Some of these prosecutions have resulted in significant 
punishment but nowhere near the punishment of a war crimes 
92. Id.  
93. Rosenbaum Interview, supra note 11. 
94. Id.  
95. Id.  
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. See id. (“[T]here is a preference in the law for people to be tried in the 
locality in which the crime occurred. Or, at least, in the country in 
which the crime occurred, if that’s possible.”). 
99. Id. 
100. See id. (noting the United States will prosecute for immigration or 
naturalization crimes if those crimes are provable).  
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conviction. In 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice charged Gilberto 
Jordan with naturalization fraud.101 Jordan was a Guatemalan soldier 
who helped to commit one of the most brutal mass killings in the 
history of the Guatemalan civil war, the massacre of Dos Erres, in 
1982.102 Jordan was sentenced to ten years in federal prison, the 
highest sentence allowed for criminal naturalization fraud.103 
In 2009, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents arrested 
Lazare Kabaya Kobagaya of Topeka, Kansas.104 Mr. Kobagaya was 
suspected of participating in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.105 Rather 
than charging Kobagaya with genocide, for which the United States 
has jurisdiction under the Genocide Statute,106 the United States 
charged him with one count of unlawful procurement of naturalization 
and one count of misuse of an alien registration card.107 Kobagaya 
faces up to ten years in prison, automatic revocation of his 
citizenship, and a fine of up to $250,000 for the unlawful procurement 
of citizenship charge.108 He also faces up to ten years in prison and a 
fine of up to $250,000 for the misuse of an alien registration card 
charge.109 Lacking the statutory jurisdiction to prosecute for the 
underlying crime, the United States sought prosecution for the next 
most serious offense available. 
IV. International Legal Obligations Violated by the 
United States and Canada 
A. Obligation to Ensure Prosecution 
The international obligation to ensure that suspected war 
criminals and human rights violators are prosecuted comes from the 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Kansas Man Charged with Immigration 
Crimes in Connection with 1994 Genocide in Rwanda (Apr. 23, 2009) 
[hereinafter Press Release, Kansas Man Charged], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/April/09-crm-385.html.  
105. See id. 
106. See Genocide, 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2009) (providing the United States 
with jurisdiction over any person in the United States for the crime of 
genocide). 
107. Press Release, Kansas Man Charged, supra note 104. 
108. Id.  
109. Id. 
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Convention),110 the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture 
Convention),111 and from emerging customary international law.112 
Both conventions mandate ratifying countries to either prosecute or 
remove for the purpose of prosecution persons suspected of 
committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.113 
Unfortunately, the plain language of the agreements has been ignored 
by many signatories, including the United States and Canada.114 
The Geneva Conventions, to which Canada and the United States 
are parties,115 mandate states party to the convention to ensure 
prosecution for grave breaches under international law.116 While the 
Conventions do not refer explicitly to war crimes or crimes against 
humanity, the grave breaches condemned in the Conventions overlap 
with the definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity.117 
110. Geneva Convention, supra note 14, art. 49. 
111. Torture Convention, supra note 14, art. 7(1). 
112. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 20; see generally G.A. Res. 60/147, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006) (adopting the Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law); S.C. Res. 1325, 
¶ 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31. 2000) (emphasizing the need for 
all states to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes, including sexual violence); S.C. Res. 1820, ¶ 4, S/RES/1820 
(June 19, 2008) (noting states’ responsibility to prosecute war crimes, 
including sexual violence). 
113. See Geneva Convention, supra note 14, art. 49; Torture Convention, 
supra note 14, art. 6(1). 
114. See Telephone Interview with Matt Eisenbrandt, Legal Counsel for 
Canadian Ctr. for Int’l Just. (Nov. 23, 2011) (noting Canada’s 
preference for deportation of suspected war criminals, despite the 
concerns about the suspect being subjected to torture or show trials).  
115. See Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, State Signatories, INT’L 
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?Read 
Form&id=375&ps=P (last visited Dec. 17, 2012). 
116. See Geneva Convention, supra note 14, art. 49. 
117. For the purpose of this Note, war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
while evolving in definition, for the purpose of this Note fit into the 
definition established by the International Military Tribunal created at 
Nuremberg to try major German war criminals. Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 284. 
The Charter defines war crimes as: 
[M]urder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor . . . of 
civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-
treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of 
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton 
destruction of cities . . . or devastation not justified by military 
necessity. 
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Article 49 of the First Geneva Convention requires states to enact 
legislation punishing grave breaches and to search for and bring 
suspected war criminals before their own courts unless another State 
has made a case for prosecuting them.118 Article 50 defines grave 
breaches as willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, and 
extensive destruction, and appropriation of property that is not 
militarily justified.119 
Many commentators take for granted that Article 49 imposes an 
obligation to either prosecute or extradite those who commit grave 
breaches of international law.120 While some have argued international 
criminal law has allowed substantial discretion in ensuring 
prosecution,121 it is difficult to escape the plain language of the 
Convention: 
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to 
search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have 
ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring 
such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own 
courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the 
provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial 
to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such 
High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.122 
This language shows a clear and unequivocal duty to ensure the 
prosecution of those who commit grave breaches, which includes war 
crimes and human rights violations. 
The Torture Convention also creates an obligation to ensure 
prosecution. Article 6(1) of the Torture Conventions requires 
 Id. art. 6(b).  
Crimes against humanity under the Charter include “murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or 
persecutions . . . in connexion [sic] with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic 
law of the country where perpetrated.” Id. art 6(c).  
118. See Geneva Convention, supra note 14, art. 49. 
119. Id. art. 50.  
120. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal 
Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 554, 564 (1995) (“The penal system of the 
Conventions requires the states parties to criminalize certain acts, and 
to prosecute or extradite the perpetrators.”). 
121. See Diane F. Orentlichert, Settling Accounts: The Duty To Prosecute 
Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. J. 2537, 2551 
(1991). 
122. Geneva Convention, supra note 14, art. 49. 
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signatories take all alleged torturers in their borders into custody.123 
Article 7 of the Torture Convention states that if parties fail to 
extradite suspected torturers, they must prosecute the torturers 
domestically for the underlying offense.124 (Organizations such as the 
Canadian Center for International Justice frequently argue that both 
the United States and Canada ignore the obligations to prosecute or 
extradite torturers.125) 
Article 7(1) of the Torture Convention states “[t]he State Party in 
territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed 
any offence referred to in article 4 is found, shall in the cases 
contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit the case 
to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.”126 For 
the United States and Canada, this means that any person suspected 
of committing torture anywhere must either be tried domestically or 
extradited for the purposes of being tried for torture. 
Some observers have argued Article 7(2) of the Torture 
Convention exempts signatories from a strict obligation to 
prosecute.127 Article 7(2) states:  
[A]uthorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in 
the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the 
law of that State. In the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph 
2, the standards of evidence required for prosecution and 
conviction shall in no way be less stringent than those which 
apply in the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph 1.128  
In both the United States and Canada, the dominant view is that 
Article 7(2) only requires that states party to the Torture Convention 
123. See Torture Convention, supra note 14, art. 6(1) (“[A]ny State Party in 
whose territory a person alleged to have committed any offence referred 
to in article 4 is present shall take him into custody or take other legal 
measures to ensure his presence.”) 
124. Id. art. 7.  
125. See Eisenbrandt Interview, supra note 114 (“If you’re talking about 
torture then [the obligation] is the UN Convention on Torture. There it 
is very clearly spelled out. The obligation is to either extradite for 
prosecution or, if that is not an option, to prosecute in your own 
country.”). 
126. Torture Convention, supra note 14, art. 7(1). 
127. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN 
TIMES OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY,  86–87  (2006) (arguing prosecutorial 
discretion is essential, even though the exercise of such discretion is 
essentially a decision to not enforce a law). Posner stresses the power of 
the executive. However, he also argues that broad prosecutorial 
discretion is given to Torture Convention signatories. Id. 
128. Torture Convention, supra note 14, art. 7(2). 
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exercise the same level of prosecutorial discretion they exercise in 
prosecuting any domestic crimes.129 
The view that Article 7(2) merely permits the same discretion to 
prosecute torture as any other domestic crime ignores basic treaty 
interpretation. The Vienna Convention on Treaties states “[a] treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose.”130 This means signatories of the 
Torture Convention must maintain the same standards of fair 
prosecution for suspects of torture that they would for any other 
trial.131 It does not and cannot mean a signatory may elect not to 
prosecute, or extradite for prosecution, suspected torturers without 
proper cause.132 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) recently adopted this 
interpretation of the Torture Convention in its landmark case 
Belgium v. Senegal.133 Belgium v. Senegal concerned the fate of the 
former President of Chad, Hissène Habré. Before being ousted from 
Chad in 1990, Habré had presided over 40,000 political killings and 
widespread torture.134 Habré then sought refuge in Senegal.135 In 2009, 
129. See Rosenbaum Interview, supra note 11 (remarking that the United 
States had an obligation only to deny human rights violators safe 
haven); Petit Interview, supra note 59 (“I don’t think there [is an 
international obligation to prosecute crimes against humanity] yet . . . . 
You may be able to argue that in a generation or two, but I don’t think 
at this stage you can certainly say it is part of international customary 
law.”) In fairness to Mr. Rosenbaum, he qualified his answer in saying 
that the United States has been prohibited by the ex post facto clause of 
the U.S. Constitution from prosecuting many instances of torture which 
occurred outside the United States. He anticipates many more cases to 
be tried domestically now that the United States has statutory 
jurisdiction. See Rosenbaum Interview, supra note 11. 
130. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
131. See CHRIS INGELSE, THE UN COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE: AN 
ASSESSMENT 357 (2001) (“[T]he discretionary power could not extend so 
far as to allow those responsible for torture to escape punishment.”) 
132. See id. 
133. Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. 
Sen.), Judgment (July 20, 2012), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1 
44/17064.pdf [hereinafter Belgium v. Senegal]. 
134. See US Inst. of Peace, Chad: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
the Crimes and Misappropriations Committed by Ex-President Habre, 
His Accomplices and/or Accessories, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW 
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 81 (Neil J. 
Kritz ed., 1992). 
135. See Aaron Solomon, The Politics of Prosecutions Under the Convention 
Against Torture, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 309, 310 (2001) (noting Senegal’s 
failure to prosecute Habré while he resided there, despite indicting him).  
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Belgium, after numerous attempts to extradite Habré for trial, 
initiated an action against Senegal seeking Habré’s extradition or 
prosecution based on the Torture Convention.136 Belgium alleged that 
Senegal’s refusal to prosecute Habré domestically or extradite him to 
Belgium for prosecution violated provisions under the Torture 
Convention and customary international law.137  
The ICJ accepted Belgium’s argument that the Torture 
Convention creates a duty for signatories to prosecute, or extradite 
for prosecution, suspected torturers. Moreover, the ICJ held that 
Senegal’s failure to seek prosecution or extradition of Habré 
constituted a breach of the Torture Convention.138 It found 
unanimously that Senegal must either prosecute Habré or extradite 
him for the purpose of prosecution immediately.139 
B. Customary International Law is Changing to Support Ensuring 
Prosecution of War Criminals 
Under customary international law, there does not yet appear to 
be an obligation to prosecute or extradite war criminals and those 
who have committed crimes against humanity.140 Customary 
international law has been defined as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law141 and consists of state practice and opinio juris.142 
State practice refers to general and consistent practice by states, while 
opinio juris means the practice is followed out of a belief of legal 
obligation.143 Overwhelmingly, most countries have chosen to deport 
suspected war criminals; extraditing or prosecuting has proven to be 
the exception rather than the rule.144 The offices responsible for the 
prosecution of war criminals in both the United States and Canada do 
136. Belgium v. Senegal, supra note 133, ¶ 1.  
137. Id.  
138. See id. ¶¶ 88, 95, 122. 
139. Id. ¶ 122. 
140. See id. ¶ 122(2) (finding the court does not have authority to entertain 
the claims of Belgium relating to alleged breaches of international law). 
141. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, art. 38(1)(b) 
(1945) [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 102(2) (1987); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4–11 (5th ed. 1998); MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, 
POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES 130 (1999). 
143. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 
142, § 102(2). 
144. See supra Part III. 
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not see any custom requiring prosecution of foreign war criminals for 
their underlying offenses.145 
This custom, however, is changing.146 Canada, along with many 
other nations, has enacted legislation to domesticate the Rome 
Statute.147 The preamble of the Rome Statute implies a duty to 
prosecute the universal crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity.148 In Judge Antonio Casesse’s iconic commentary 
on the Rome Statute, he states that signatories have obligations to 
see that serious breaches of international criminal law are punished.149 
Another commentator argues that the preamble of the Rome Statute, 
while not formally creating a duty to prosecute, still presupposes a 
duty to ensure prosecution.150 
The preamble of the Rome Statute is strong evidence for a change 
in customary international law favoring state prosecution of war 
criminals. It recalls that “it is the duty of every State to exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international 
crimes[.]”151 This is consistent with the basic tenants of treaty 
interpretation as laid out in the Vienna Convention.152 Under Article 
31(2) of the Vienna Convention, the preamble of any treaty is to be 
used in interpreting the meaning of it.153 While this may not be 
145. See Rosenbaum Interview, supra note 11 (remarking that often it is 
impossible to get a country to even seek extradition for its nationals); 
Petit Interview, supra note 59 (remarking that although such an 
obligation may arise in a coming generation, there is nothing close a 
customary obligation to prosecute at the current time). 
146. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/147, supra note 112, at III(4) (recognizing that 
in cases of gross violations of international human rights law and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law, states party have an 
obligation to prosecute criminals or extradite such criminals found 
within their borders for prosecution). 
147. See Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, pmbl., S.C. 2000, 
c. 24 (Can.).  
148. See Rome Statute, supra note 20, pmbl.  
149. See Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones, The Rome 
Statute: A Tentative Assessment, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1906 (Antonio 
Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002). 
150. See Otto Triffterer, Legal and Political Implications of Domestic 
Ratification and Implementation Processes, in THE ROME STATUTE AND 
DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDERS 15–17 (Claus Kreβ & Flavia Lattanzi eds., 
2000).  
151. See Rome Statute, supra note 20, pmbl. 
152. See Vienna Convention, supra note 130, art. 31 (noting the preamble is 
part of a treaty and shall be taken into account in interpretation). 
153. See id. art. 31(2). The Vienna Convention says: 
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enough to create an explicit duty within the Rome Statute itself, the 
assumption of a duty stated in the preamble creates an inference that 
there is already a pre-existing duty in customary international law to 
seek out and ensure the prosecution of war criminals. 
The General Assembly of the United Nations has referenced this 
duty in several resolutions. In 2005, the General Assembly passed 
Resolution 60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law.154 The preamble of the resolution 
clearly stated that international law contains the obligation to 
prosecute perpetrators of certain international crimes, and that the 
duty to prosecute reinforces international legal obligations.155 Section 
III(4) of the Resolution states that in serious violations of 
international humanitarian law constituting crimes under 
international law, states have a duty to investigate, submit to 
prosecution, and punish war criminals and human rights abusers.156 
The General Assembly also passed Resolution 3074, Principles of 
International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and 
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity.157 The resolution calls for member states to take necessary 
domestic and international measures to halt and prevent war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, including prosecuting or extraditing 
The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty 
shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble 
and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was 
made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion 
of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or 
more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and 
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the 
treaty.  
 Id. (emphasis added). 
154. See G.A. Res. 60/147, supra note 112. 
155. See id. pmbl. The Resolution recalls: 
[T]hat international law contains the obligation to prosecute 
perpetrators of certain international crimes in accordance with 
international obligations of States and the requirements of 
national law or as provided for in the applicable statutes of 
international judicial organs, and that the duty to prosecute 
reinforces the international legal obligations to be carried out in 
accordance with national legal requirements and procedures and 
supports the concept of complementarity[.] 
 Id.  
156. See id. § III(4). 
157. G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVII), U.N. GOAR, 28th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/3074 
(Dec. 3, 1973), at 78. 
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suspects for prosecution.158 Other UN agencies support this position. 
In the draft code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, adopted by the International Law Commission in 1996, 
Article 9 explicitly states that there is an obligation by states to 
prosecute or extradite an individual alleged to have committed 
genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes.159 
The UN Security Council has also supported the idea of an 
obligation to ensure the prosecution of war criminals. In 2000, the 
Security Council passed Resolution 1325, which emphasized it is the 
“responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to 
prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes.”160 Eight years later, the Security Council passed 
another resolution, in which it called upon member states to “comply 
with their obligations for prosecuting persons responsible for [war 
crimes and crimes against humanity]” and stressed the importance of 
“ending impunity . . . as part of a comprehensive approach to seeking 
sustainable peace, justice, truth, and national reconciliation.”161 
Even if the prevailing customary international law does not 
suggest that states must ensure the prosecution of war criminals, only 
in limited circumstances will customary international law override the 
enforcement of a treaty.162 Using customary international law as an 
excuse to ignore treaty obligations, as the United States and Canada 
have done, would allow a collection of nations to effectively say one 
thing, yet do another. Perhaps customary law does not yet support a 
158. Id. 
159. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
reprinted in 1996 U.N.Y.B. 15, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1.  
160. See S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 112, ¶ 11. 
161. See S.C. Res. 1820, supra note 112, ¶ 4. The Resolution specifically 
addresses gender-based crime, in the context of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. See id. 
162. See OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE 7 (Robert Jennings & 
Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992). 
States may . . . dispense altogether with most rules of 
international law. There are, however, a few rules from which no 
derogation is permissible. The latter–rules of [j]us cogens, or 
peremptory norms of general international law—have been 
defined in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of 
Treaties 1969 . . . as norms accepted and recognized by the 
international community of states as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified 
only by subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character; and Article 64 contemplates the emergence of 
new rules of [j]us cogens in the future. 
 
 Id. (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).  
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hard rule that states must ensure that war crimes suspects are 
prosecuted, but that time is certainly approaching. 
C. Criticism of Canada’s Policies 
Canadian officials have made clear that they do not consider 
actual prosecution of suspected war criminals to be a priority.163 As 
Public Safety Minister Vic Toews said, “Canada is not the UN. It’s 
not our responsibility to make sure each one of these [suspected 
criminals] faces justice in their own countries.”164 Various 
organizations and commentators have taken issue with Canada’s 
overwhelming preference for deportation rather than prosecution or 
extradition.165 Lawyers Rights Watch Canada,166 Amnesty 
International,167 and the Canadian Center for International Justice168 
are among the loudest voices. They claim Canada is failing its legal 
obligations by not adequately ensuring that suspected war criminals 
are prosecuted.169 
Unfortunately, Canada has chosen to address the issue of 
suspected war criminals not with prosecution, or with extradition in 
163. See, e.g., Payton, supra note 3. 
164. Id. 
165. Foremost among these are Amnesty Canada and the Canadian Center 
for International Justice. The sole mandate of the Canadian Center for 
International Justice is to work on accountability for torture and war 
crimes when there is some connection to Canada. See Eisenbrandt 
Interview, supra note 114. 
166. See Letter from Catherine Morris, B.A., L.L.B., L.L.M. & Gail 
Davidson, Exec. Dir., Lawyers Rights Watch Canada, to The 
Honourable Jason Kenney, P.C., M.P. (Aug. 21, 2011), available at 
http://www.lrwc.org/recent-public-statements-against-amnesty-internat 
ional-canada/(“[I]mmigration proceedings are not intended to take the 
place of criminal proceedings.”).  
167. See Jeff Davis & Robert Hiltz, Prosecute, Not Deport, Suspected War 
Criminals: Amnesty, NAT’L POST, Aug. 5, 2011, http://news.nationa 
lpost.com/2011/08/02/prosecute-not-deport-suspected-war-criminals-
amnesty/. 
168. See Stewart Bell, Man Deported in Alleged Cannibalism, War Crimes 
Case, NAT’L POST, Apr. 28, 2011, http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/ 
04/28/man-deported-in-alleged-canabalism-war-crimes-case/. 
169. Eisenbrandt points out: 
The actual international legal obligation is to either prosecute 
someone here or to extradite them to a country where they will 
then stand trial . . . so deporting them does not comply with 
Canada’s legal obligations. On top of that . . . generally they are 
almost always going to be returned to a situation where they 
just go free, and that’s not really advancing the accountability 
cause at all. 
 Id. 
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the hope of prosecution, but by simply deporting war crime 
suspects.170 The Canadian Center for International Justice in 
particular has criticized the Canadian government heavily for their 
policies.171 They see this as an abrogations not only of obligations 
under international agreements to ensure prosecution, but also as 
violations of the rights of the deportees themselves.172 
D. Criticism of the United States’ Policies 
Amnesty International has many of the same critiques of the 
United States as it does of Canada.173 Amnesty reports that the 
United States has improved but that focusing on immigration law 
solutions “isn’t ideal.”174 Immigration- or deportation-based policies 
“[don’t] help to stop atrocities,” Amnesty says.175 “You’re sending 
back someone who is a severe abuser to those countries where they 
were committing those crimes.”176 
The current Director of the Human Rights and Special 
Prosecution, Eli Rosenbaum, accepts the risk of deportation without 
the guarantee of prosecution.177 He also disagrees that the Geneva 
170. See Sandro Contenta, At Large in Canada: Alleged War Criminals, 
GLOBAL POST, Aug. 25, 2011, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/ne 
ws/regions/americas/110824/canadas-wanted-war-criminals.  
171. See Eisenbrandt Interview, supra note 115. Specifically, Eisenbrandt 
worries that the targets of Canadian investigations are not the ones 
Canada should be focusing on: 
[T]hose really aren’t the most wanted, because if you look at the 
list, these aren’t the people who they are prosecuting. These are 
people who have allegations against them and we don’t 
necessarily know what the evidence is. They are allegations that 
these people were involved in war crimes or part of an 
organization that had been involved in war crimes. 
 Id.  
172. See id. (explaining that if someone is an alleged war criminal, Canada is 
under an obligation to extradite or prosecute that person, and that 
Canada’s deportation of such individuals opens the opportunity for 
them to be tortured). 
173. See Paloma Esquivel, U.S. Immigration Authorities Boost Efforts to 
Hunt War Criminals, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2011, http://articles.latimes. 
com/2011/oct/23/local/la-me-ice-war-crimes-20111019  
 (“‘The U.S.,’ [Vienna Colucci, senior policy advisor at Amnesty 
International] said, ‘needs to be more willing to use criminal prosecution 
at home.’”). 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. See Rosenbaum Interview, supra note 11 (“Normally, the priority is to 
enforce US immigration law and get [the criminal] out. We try whenever 
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Convention creates an obligation that could supersede US law, 
creating a duty to ensure prosecution.178 “It’s not a perfect system,” 
said Rosenbaum, “so it does not provide a guarantee of fair trial or 
proper treatment. But, I can’t think of a system, a workable system 
that would guarantee that.”179 
V. Recommendations for the United States and 
Canada 
A. Solutions Going Forward: Canada 
Canada has jurisdiction to prosecute suspected war criminals and 
those who committed crimes against humanity.180 Despite this, 
Canada has focused on ensuring that suspected war criminals do not 
find safe haven in Canada, instead of ensuring that they are 
prosecuted for their crimes.181 If Canada is to meet its international 
legal obligations, which require Canada to ensure the prosecution of 
suspected war criminals, Canada must change course. Canada must 
put in place legislation that ensures suspected war criminals are 
prosecuted.  
Canada can reach its international obligations by amending its 
Immigration Statute to prohibit the removal of suspected war 
criminals without a guarantee of criminal prosecution. Canada’s 
Immigration Statute restricts removal of suspects if the suspect is at 
risk of persecution, torture, or cruel and unusual punishment.182 It 
does not address the likelihood of a war crimes suspect being 
prosecuted. 
To meet its international obligations, Canada must, at a 
minimum amend the Canada War Crimes Act and Immigration 
Statutes to address this weakness. Hypothetical language for the 
statute could read:  
 
we can to get them prosecuted, but only in a small minority of cases do 
we succeed in that.”). 
178. See id. (“The Geneva Convention is not something that supersedes US 
law.”) 
179. Id. 
180. Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24 (Can.). 
181. See Eisenbrandt Interview, supra note 114 (noting the government’s 
stated preference for deportation). 
182. See Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, § 115 S.C. 2001, c. 27 
(amended 2012) (Can.) (stating a person “shall not be removed from 
Canada to a country where they would be at risk of persecution for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group or political opinion or at risk of torture or cruel and unusual 
treatment or punishment”). 
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1) Canada shall assign agencies to search for and locate persons   
    suspected of war crimes or crimes against humanity.  
2) If Canada locates persons suspected of war crimes or crimes  
    against humanity, Canada shall: 
 
a) prosecute the person under the Crimes Against 
Humanity and War Crimes Act, or 
 
b) extradite or remove the person to a country that has 
given reasonable assurance that the person shall be 
prosecuted for war crimes or crimes against humanity.  
 
Part 1 of the hypothetical statute addresses the mandate that 
Canada seek out war criminals and human rights violators.183 Part 2 
addresses the obligation to ensure, either by prosecution or by 
assurance of prosecution, that suspected war criminals do not escape 
justice for their crimes. If Canada enacts a statute with this language, 
or substantially similar language, and implements procedures to carry 
out the new language, Canada can conform to its international 
obligations.  
B. Solutions Going Forward: United States 
A statutory solution in the United States is also preferable but 
slightly more complicated. The United States now has the jurisdiction 
to prosecute genocide, torture, and war crimes, but lacked jurisdiction 
as recently as twenty years ago.184 This creates a temporal limitation 
on jurisdiction, as the United States cannot prosecute anyone for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity that occurred before the statutes 
were enacted. For example, the new genocide statute permits the 
prosecution of any person suspected of committing genocide provided 
that person is physically in the United States,185 but the older 
statutes required that the perpetrator or victim be a US citizen or the 
genocide be carried out in the United States.186 Some are hopeful the 
183. See supra Part II. 
184. See Douglass Cassel, Empowering United States Courts to Hear Crimes 
Within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 35 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 421, 421 (2000) (noting the United States courts’ uneven 
jurisdiction to prosecute genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity).  
185. Genocide, 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e)(2)(D) (2009). 
186. Rosenbaum laments that the United States waited so long, until 1988, 
to provide any statutory jurisdiction for the crime of genocide, and then 
only with limited jurisdiction. See Rosenbaum Interview, supra note 11. 
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new jurisdiction will allow the United States to finally take the lead in 
ensuring that those who commit war crimes and crimes against 
humanity are brought to justice.187 However, without a statute forcing 
the hand of the United States to actually use its newfound 
jurisdiction, it is likely that the United States will continue to use the 
easier avenues of immigration law.188 
Hypothetical statutory language could read: 
1) The United States shall assign agencies to search for and 
locate persons suspected of war crimes or crimes against 
humanity. 
2) If the United States locates a person suspected of war crimes 
or crimes against humanity, the United States shall: 
     
a) prosecute the person under the relevant statutory 
authority, or 
 
b) extradite or remove the person to a state that has 
given reasonable assurance that the person shall be 
prosecuted for war crimes or crimes against 
humanity. 
3) If the United States cannot prosecute the person for lack of 
temporal jurisdiction, and no other state grants reasonable 
assurances that the person shall be prosecuted for war crimes or 
crimes against humanity, the United States shall prosecute the 
person under the next most serious charge applicable to the 
person, including immigration or naturalization fraud.  
This hypothetical statute forces the United States to live up to its 
international obligations.189 Part 1 of the statute mandates that the 
United States locate suspected war criminals and human rights 
violators. Part 2 provides the options available to the United States 
that would allow it to comply with its obligation to ensure 
prosecution. Part 3 deals with the tricky issue of temporal 
187. Rosenbaum is among the optimistic: 
As times go on as, regrettably, these crimes continue to be 
committed around the world, these people will continue to come 
to the United States. Eventually, we won’t be seeing cases in 
which prosecution was barred because the crime was committed 
before the statue went into force. I’m absolutely confident that 
we will be seeing more of these cases prosecuted. 
 Id.  
188. See 18 U.S.C. § 1091(e) (demonstrating that the prosecution of war 
criminals with the statute’s jurisdiction is not mandatory).  
189. See supra Part IV. 
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jurisdiction. While still not fully complying with the obligation to seek 
prosecution for the underlying offense, the new statute at least 
guarantees human rights violators and war criminals will see some 
justice, even if it is not the justice mandated by international 
agreement. 
VI. Conclusion 
Canada and the United States have made great strides in creating 
agencies to seek out and bring to justice war criminals, but they have 
not gone far enough to meet their international legal obligations. 
Canada and the United States have given themselves jurisdiction to 
prosecute those who are enemies of all mankind and worked to deny 
them safe harbor in their borders. However, it is not enough to ensure 
that war criminals cannot find safe harbor. To meet the international 
obligations imposed by the Geneva Conventions, the Torture 
Convention, and emerging customary international law, Canada and 
the United States must act to ensure that those who commit the 
gravest breaches are brought to justice. Unfortunately, neither 
country has sufficient procedures in place to ensure war criminals are 
prosecuted for their crimes. 
One possible way to ensure the prosecution of suspected war 
criminals and human rights violators is to create statutes requiring all 
avenues be taken to see war criminals tried for their crimes. Even 
with the temporal limitations imposed in the United States, the 
statutes proposed in this Note will force Canada and the United 
States into compliance with their international obligations. 
Canada and the United States must implement these legislative 
statutes which mandate that they search for, locate, and ensure the 
prosecution of suspected war criminals and human rights violators. 
They must bring themselves in conformity with the international 
agreements they signed and emerging customary international law. It 
is no longer enough, if it ever was, to simply deny safe harbor to the 
war criminals. Canada and the United States must live up to their 
international obligations and end impunity for the war criminals and 
human rights violators of the world. 
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